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In a recent presidential address to the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, Thomas Schwartz argued for historians to recognize the ongoing importance of traditional domestic politics on American foreign policy. Heeding Schwartz's call, this dissertation uses declassified government documents to reveal the high level of concern the Reagan White House placed on the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. Originating in discussions within both activist and arms control communities, the campaign spread across the nation creating a fear in the popular and political culture that nothing short of the "fate of the Earth" was at stake. Debates over the freeze dominated radio and television talk shows, as movie stars and celebrities, prominent intellectuals and scholars, bishops and reverends, and governors and congressional leaders, lined up for and against the idea. Both houses of Congress debated the idea of an arms freeze, with the House of Representatives endorsing it. The effects of this movement can be seen in moral and religious debates over the meaning of "pro-life," in song lyrics, album covers, and music videos, in made-for-TV movies, in box office booms and busts, and in the halls of the White House, where the message was too loud and too important to tune out or ignore. To obfuscate the critiques of the movement, I argue that the Reagan administration was forced to co-opt it, both in terms of rhetoric and in actual policy making decisions. In effect, by becoming a magnet for arms control reform, the Freeze campaign did not fail, but became the victim of its own successes.